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THE OBLIGATION TO REFOREST PRIVATE
LAND UNDER THE WASHINGTON FOREST
PRACTICES ACT
Private landowners in Washington have been required to reforest land
after logging since 1945. The Washington Forest Practices Act of 1974'
and its predecessor 2 have primarily affected the state's timber industry,
which has long been familiar with the reforestation requirement. Many
nonindustrial forest landowners, 3 however, are unaware of the require-
ments of the 1974 Act. The 1974 Act requires that any owner of forest
land4 who removes the trees for any reason, whether to log one hundred
acres for income or to clear one acre for a homesite, must satisfy the
reforestation requirements of the Act.
Part I of this comment explains the requirements for satisfactory re-
forestation, the exceptions to those requirements, and how the obligation
to reforest is enforced. Part II discusses a case recently before the Forest
Practices Appeals Board5 to illustrate a current issue in enforcing the law
and to illustrate a problem created by the effects of that enforcement. The
enforcement issue is whether persons who acquire land that needs to be
reforested are obligated to reforest the land. This comment concludes that
they are obligated to reforest. The resulting problem is that persons who
acquire land that needs to be reforested may be unaware of that require-
ment, and thus unable to allocate fairly the costs of reforestation in their
transaction to acquire the land. One solution to the problem is amending
the Act to improve the notice of the obligation to reforest that purchasers
of land receive. Part III suggests criteria for evaluating legislative propos-
als requiring improved notice to subsequent landowners and concludes
that sellers of forest land should be required to give purchasers actual
notice of the obligation to reforest. 6
1. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 76.09 (1979).
2. Act of Mar. 15, 1945, ch. 193, 1945 Wash. Laws 556 (repealed 1974).
3. Nonindustrial forest landowners are defined as persons owning forested land who are not di-
rectly affiliated with a processing plant. W. Koss & B. Scorr, A PROFILE OF WESTERN WASHING-
TOWS NONINDUSTRIAL FOREST LANDOWNERS 3 (Dep't of Natural Resources Report No. 37, 1978).
4. Forest land is defined as "all land which is capable of supporting a merchantable stand of
timber and is not being actively used for a use which is incompatible with timber growing." WASH.
REv. CODE § 76.09.020(6) (1979); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-16-010(17) (1980).
5. Department of Natural Resources v. Petra. No. 79-1 (Wash. Forest Practices App. Bd., Dec.
16, 1980).
6. A discussion of all of a purchaser's potential actions and remedies against a vendor of land is
beyond the scope of this comment.
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I. THE REQUIREMENT OF REFORESTATION
A. The Scope of the Act
I. Who Is Affected and What Is Required
Forest practices 7 on all nonfederal land in Washington are regulated
under the Forest Practices Act of 1974 (the Act). Requiring reforestation
of forest land following logging is one of two primary purposes of the
Act. 8 The second major purpose of the Act is to regulate forest practices
to protect both forest soils and public resources. 9 Unlike the regulation of
forest practices, reforestation has been required since Washington's first
forest practices act was enacted in 1945 (the 1945 Act). 10
7. "'Forest practice" shall mean any activity conducted on or directly pertaining to forest land
and relating to growing, harvesting, or processing timber, including but not limited to:
(a) Road and trail construction;
(b) Harvesting, final and intermediate:
(c) Precommercial thinning:
(d) Reforestation;
(e) Fertilization;
(f) Prevention and suppression of diseases and insects:
(g) Salvage of trees; and
(h) Brush control.
WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.020(8) (1979); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-16-010(19) (1980).
8. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.010(2) (1979) provides:
The legislature further finds and declares it to be in the public interest of this state to create and
maintain ... a comprehensive state-wide system of laws and forest practices regulations which
will achieve the following purposes and policies:
(a) Afford protection to, promote, foster and encourage timber growth, and require such min-
imum reforestation of commercial tree species on forest lands as will reasonably utilize the tim-
ber growing capacity of the soil following current timber harvest ....
9. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.010(2)(b) (1979). Public resources are defined as "water, fish and
wildlife, and ... capital improvements of the state or its political subdivision." Id. § 76.09.020(13);
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-16-010(35) (1980).
Other purposes of the Act are to recognize the public and private interest in the profitable growing
and harvesting of timber; to promote efficiency through maximum operating freedom; to avoid dupli-
cation of regulation; to provide for interagency input and coordination; and to consider land use plan-
ning goals and zoning. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.010(2)(c)-(f). (h) (1979). Another purpose is to
achieve compliance with federal and state water pollution control laws respecting nonpoint sources.
Id. § 76.09.010(2)(g). Washington's Act is one of several state forest practices acts which were
enacted partly in response to the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1978). Cubbage & Ellefson, State Forest Practice Laws: A Major Policy
Force Unique to the Natural Resources Conmuniy, 13 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 421, 421 (1980):
Pardo. Forestry Law and Policy. 7 U. TOL. L. REV. 999. 1022 (1976). See generally Miskovsky &
Van Hook, Regulation of Forestry Related Nonpoint Source Pollution Under the Federal Water Pol-
lution ControlAmendments of 1972, 9 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 645 (1976).
For a general discussion of the Washington Forest Practices Act, see Comment, Protection of Rec-
reation and Scenic Beauty Under the Washington Forest Practices Act. 53 WASH. L. REV. 443
(1978).
10. The 1945 Act was one of the "seed tree" laws that were passed in a number of states. Act of
Mar. 15, 1945, ch. 193. § 4, 1945 Wash. Laws 556 (repealed 1974). It required reforestation, but
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The 1945 Act had only a minor effect on owners of nonindustrial forest
land. Landowners under the 1945 Act satisfied their statutory obligation
to reforest in one of two ways. First, the obligation to reforest was satis-
fied by leaving a small number of seed trees. I I Although natural regenera-
tion from seed trees often failed to produce anything but brush and non-
commercial tree species, 12 the landowner was not required to do any
additional reforestation work. The landowner was merely required to
leave a seed source, not to guarantee reseeding or to agree to grow
trees. 13 Alternatively, the obligation to reforest was satisfied by forfeiting
a bond. 14 The supervisor of forestry would then use the money to reforest
the land. The bond often failed to cover the costs of artificial reforesta-
tion. 15
The 1974 Forest Practices Act repealed the 1945 Act.' 6 The new act
regulated forest practices only to the extent that logging activities threatened seed trees. State of
Washington, Op. Att'y Gen. 53-55-84 (July 1953).
For an excellent discussion of modem forest practice laws and older seed tree laws, see Cubbage &
Ellefson, supra note 9. Other discussions of the history of forest conservation are found in: Ayer,
Public Regulation of Private Forestry: A Survey and a Proposal, 10 HARv. J. LEGIs. 407, 408-20
(1973); Quinney, Small Private Forest Landownership in the United States-Individual and Social
Perception, 3 NAT. REsoutcEs J. 379, 380-81 (1964); and Comment, Regulation of Private Logging
in California, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 139, 140-42 (1975).
11. The 1945 Act required a landowner or an operator to get a cutting permit from the supervisor
of forestry. The permit was obtained in one of two ways. First, the applicant could promise to leave a
certain number of trees standing after harvest to serve as a seed source for natural regeneration of the
logged area. Act of Mar. 15, 1945, ch. 193, §§ 3-4, 1945 Wash. Laws 556 (repealed 1974). Alter-
natively, the applicant could submit a plan to reforest, either by planting seedlings or by some other
silvicultural means. Id.
In western Washington, an operator satisfied the minimum requirements for seed trees by leaving
five per cent of the area uncut. In eastern Washington, the requirements were satisfied by leaving four
seed trees per acre in Ponderosa Pine stands, and by leaving two acres out of every forty uncut in
other stands. Landowners were encouraged to satisfy the seed tree requirements by leaving strips of
timber that were marginally economical to log. Id. §§ 5-6. The supervisor of forestry's policy was
not to require reforestation on land considered likely to become agricultural or residential.
12. Timber companies and the state and federal governments developed effective reforestation
programs that increasingly did not rely on natural regeneration in western Washington. See State v.
Dexter, 32 Wn. 2d 551,556, 202 P.2d 906, 908, af'dmem., 338 U.S. 863 (1949). Natural regenera-
tion became economically impractical for several reasons: valuable trees had to be left behind as seed
trees; seed trees often were blown down or destroyed by fire; seed production was unreliable; rodents
ate the seeds; and seedlings did not compete well with brush. Artificial reforestation by growing and
planting seedlings was underway as early as the 1930s, when the state's Webster Forest Nursery was
established near Olympia. Currently, industrial forest landowners in western Washington rely almost
entirely on planted seedlings for reforestation.
13. State v. Dexter, 32 Wn. 2d 551, 561,202 P.2d 906, 911, affdmem., 338 U.S. 863 (1949).
14. If the operator cut the seed trees or failed to comply with the optional plan, then the supervi-
sor of forestry could require a cash deposit or performance bond of up to $24.00 per acre. If the area
was not reforested after five years, then the bond was forfeited. Act of Mar. 3, 1953, ch. 44, § 3,
1953 Wash. Laws 59 (repealed 1974).
15. See note 111 infra (discussion of the costs of reforestation).
16. WASH. REv. CODE § 76.09.915 (1979).
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abandoned the seed tree method of reforestation. Rather than require a
particular method, the Act requires a particular result. Satisfactory re-
forestation generally must be accomplished within three years after com-
pletion of harvest. If, however, a natural regeneration plan has been ap-
proved by the Department of Natural Resources (the Department),' 7 then
reforestation need not be completed until up to five years after harvest. 18
The Washington Forest Practices Board is responsible for implement-
ing the policies and the provisions contained in the Act. The Board is
authorized to define satisfactory reforestation and to promulgate regula-
tions necessary to accomplish the Act's purposes. 19 In 1976 the Board
adopted the Washington Forest Practices Rules and Regulations which
contain detailed requirements for reforestation as well as extensive regu-
lations concerning other forest practices. 20
According to the regulations, reforestation is not required as long as a
minimum number of vigorous, undamaged seedlings, saplings, or mer-
chantable trees per acre remain standing after logging. The minimum ac-
ceptable number of trees differs for lands lying east and west of the Cas-
cade mountains. West of the Cascades, reforestation is required whenever
17. The Department of Natural Resources is responsible for administering and enforcing the Act.
Id. § 76.09.040 (1).
18. Id. § 76.09.070. If seed or seedlings are not available, then a period longer than three years
may be authorized.
Although the Act gives landowners three years to complete reforestation, slash disposal activities
that are necessary for reforestation must be done at the time of harvest. Harvesting must leave the
land in a condition "conducive to future timber production," WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-30-020(5)
(1980). W.A.C. § 222-30-090 provides:
[Unless the landowner agrees to assume responsibility for post-harvest site preparation.] the
operator shall leave the site in a condition suitable for reforestation ....
(I) The Following site preparation is required when necessary to establish a condition suitable
for reforestation.
(a) Cutting or slashing of all noncommercial tree species or nonmerchantable size trees com-
monly known as "whips"....
(b) Pile or windrow slash, or
(c) Mechanically scatter slash, or
(d) Leave the cutover area in a condition for controlled broadcast burning, and subsequently
bum.
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-30-090 (1980).
In addition, slash disposal is required "where the forest landowner has applied for and been
granted an extension of time for reforestation on the grounds that slash disposal is necessary or desir-
able before reforestation." Id. § 222-30- 100(3). See also id. § 222-30-080(3)(a) (slash clean-up
on otherwise plantable landings); WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 222-24-060(5)(c). (6)(b) (1980) (refores-
tation of gravel pits and spoil disposal sites).
19. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.040(1) (1979).
20. WASH. ADMIN. CODE tit. 222 (1980). Rule changes proposed in 1981 alter the form but not
the substance of the reforestation requirements.
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fewer than three hundred trees per acre remain standing. 21 East of the
Cascades, one hundred trees per acre must remain standing to avoid the
obligation to reforest. 22
If reforestation is required, then the regulations prescribe minimum
standards. 23 Satisfactory reforestation must be completed within three
years after logging, or within five years if a natural regeneration plan is
approved by the Department. 24 In western Washington, at the end of that
period, the land must be stocked with three hundred well-distributed, vig-
orous seedlings per acre of commercial species. 25 In eastern Washington,
the minimum acceptable stocking is one hundred and fifty seedlings per
acre. 26 The trees must survive at least one growing season. 27 In addition
to requiring a minimum number of seedlings, the regulations require re-
forestation with the same tree species that were harvested. 28
A landowner who reforests by planting or by seeding must file a report
with the Department. 29 Within one year after receiving a reforestation re-
port, or within the three to five year period allowed for reforestation based
21. If 50% or more of the timber volume is removed, then reforestation is required, either for
clearcutting or for partial cutting. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-34-010(I)(a) (1980). Reforestation is
not required, however, as long as at least three hundred trees per acre remain standing. The trees must
be well-distributed on the area harvested. Id. § 222-34-010(l)(b)(iv).
22. Id. § 222-34-020(1)(b)(iv).
23. Id. §§ 222-34-010(5) to (8), -020(5) to (8). There are standards for seedlings, natural re-
generation, partial cuts, and for any alternative reforestation plan.
24. WASH. REv. CODE § 76.09.070 (1979); WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 222-34-010(2),
-020(2) (1980).
25. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-34-010(4) (1980). The Department can waive this requirement
if it determines that fewer than three hundred trees will fully use the timber growing capacity of the
site.
The regulation for reforestation of clearcuts is the only one which specifically refers to the accept-
able level of three hundred trees per acre. Id. § 222-34-010(2). This standard, however, applies to
partial cuts and seed tree methods of reforestation as well. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.070 (1979)
("satisfactory reforestation as defined by the rules and regulations . . . shall be completed within
three years .... "); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-34-030(4)(b) (1980) (acceptable stocking levels
must be achieved by inspection date).
26. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-34-020(4) (1980).
27. Id. § 222-34-010(4), -020(4).
28. Id. § 222-34-010(3). The Department may approve a different species for reforestation if
the reforestation plan shows that the new species is preferable for any of three reasons: 1) it will be
more physically productive on the site, or 2) it will produce greater economic return, or 3) it will help
control forest insects or diseases.
This provision has important consequences. A common occurrence under the 1945 Act-the har-
vesting of valuable conifers, and then the natural reseeding of alder, maple, and other hardwoods-is
not acceptable under the 1974 Act.
29. The landowner must file a reforestation report with the Department either after completing
planting or at the end of the normal planting season. When artificial seeding is used, the report must
be filed two growing seasons after seeding. WASH. REv. CODE § 76.09.070 (1979); WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 222-34-030(2), (4) (1980). The information which must be included in a reforestation re-
port is described in the regulations. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-34-030(3) (1980).
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on an approved natural regeneration plan, the Department must inspect
the area. The Department must notify the landowner if reforestation has
failed, or if further inspections are needed. 30 If there are fewer than the
minimum number of trees per acre that have survived one year or if the
area is reforested with a different species than that harvested, then the
Department must require supplemental plantings and must require control
of competing vegetation. 31 The Department will not ordinarily notify the
landowner that reforestation is satisfactory. If the landowner requests
notification, however, the Department will confirm in writing that no fur-
ther reforestation obligation remains. 32
The Forest Practices Act of 1974 rejected a scheme tolerating reforesta-
tion failures and replaced it with a scheme requiring successful reforesta-
tion. Although the landowner is not required to manage actively the new
stand of trees, the landowner is required either to leave behind, or to es-
tablish, a stand of a minimum number of a particular species of trees.
2. Exception for Land Converted to Another Use
Land converted to another use is exempt from the Act's reforestation
requirements. An applicant must disclose to the Department on a forest
practice application 33 whether any land described in the application will
30. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.070 (1979); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-34-030(4)(b) (1980). If
the Department fails to inspect or fails to give notice of unsatisfactory reforestation within the re-
quired time, then reforestation is deemed satisfactory and the Department cannot require additional
work. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-34-030(4)(c) (1980).
31. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-34-030(4)(b) (1980). The Department may require more than
two supplemental plantings only if stocking improvement is feasible and if it is necessary to protect
public resources.
32. Id. § 222-34-030(4)(c).
33. A forest practice begins with an application or notification to the Department on a prescribed
form. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.060 (1979); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-20-010 (1980). The ap-
plication includes among other things: the names and addresses of the forest landowner, the timber
owner, and the operator; a description of the proposed forest practice; topographic maps; a descrip-
tion of the silvicultural or harvesting method to be used; and a proposed plan for reforestation if the
land is not intended to be converted to another use. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.060(l), (3) (1979).
Forest practices are divided into four classes, based on the operation's potential impact on the
environment. Class I forest practices do not require a notification or an application to the Department
to proceed, but must comply with all the other provisions of the Act, including the reforestation
requirements. Class II forest practices require notification to the Department and a delay of five days
before the operation can begin, to give the Department time for inspection and approval. Class III and
IV forest practices require an application to the Department and fourteen and thirty days, respec-
tively, before the operation may begin. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.050 (1979); WASH. ADMIN. CODE
88 222-12-030, -20-020 (1980).
The Department either approves or disapproves the application within the allotted time, normally
after a field inspection of the site. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 76.09.050 (1), (5), .150 (1979). The ap-
proved application is effective for one year, and may be renewed only by a new application. Id. §
76.09.060 (6); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-20-080 (1980).
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be converted to a use other than commercial timber production within
three years after harvesting is competed. 34 The Department must receive
and approve the application before any forest practice may begin.35 The
Department has thirty days either to approve or to deny a proposed con-
version to another use. 36 If the Department approves the application, and
if the conversion to another use is in fact initiated within three years, then
the reforestation requirements of the Act do not apply. 37 If the conversion
to another use is not initiated in time, then the reforestation requirements
apply, and reforestation must be accomplished within one additional
year.38
Landowners who intend to subdivide and to sell land for development
generally are required to reforest if the land will not actually be converted
to another use within three years after logging. The Department does not
recognize division of the land and sale, with or without platting, as an
actual conversion to a nonforest use. Subdivided land must be reforested
unless a house, a pasture, or some other use that is incompatible with
timber growing is actually initiated within three years after logging. 39 The
purpose of the requirement of an actual conversion is to prevent landown-
ers from evading the reforestation requirements by "converting,"
through subdivision and sale, land that is never actually used for non-
34. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.060(3) (1979). Conversion to a use other than timber operation is
defined as a "bona fide conversion to an active use which is incompatible with timber growing
." Id. § 76.09.020(4); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-16-010(9) (1980).
The forest practice application must be signed by the landowner, or include a statement signed by
the landowner, indicating the intention to convert the land to another use. WASH. REV. CODE §
76.09.060(3)(c) (1979); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-20-010(5) (1980).
35. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-20-010(1) (1980). See note 33 supra.
36. Forest practices on land being converted to another use are Class IV forest practices. WASH.
REv. CODE § 76.09.050(1) (1979); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-16-050(2)(a) (1980).
37. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.060(3)(a)(i) (1979); WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 222-20-050,
-34-010()(a), -020(1)(a), -050(1) (1980).
In addition to land actually converted to another use, the Department may exempt from reforesta-
tion land that is likely to be converted to urban development within ten years. WASH. REV. CODE §
76.09.070 (1979); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-34-050(2) (1980). The anticipated conversion must
be consistent with local or regional land use plans or ordinances, and the land must not be designated
for tax purposes as reforestation land under R.C.W. ch. 84.28, as forest land under R.C.W. ch.
84.33, or as timber land under R.C.W. ch. 84.34.
Two other exemptions from reforestation exist. They are for utility rights-of-way, WASH. ADMIN.
CODE § 222-34-050(3) (1980), and for land owned or being acquired by a public agency for a
specific project inconsistent with commercial timber production. Id. § 222-34-050(4).
When a forest practice on land being converted to another use is completed, then the land loses its
tax status as forest land or reforestation land, unless the conversion is to a purpose permitted under a
current use tax agreement. WASH. RE,. CODE § 76.09.060(3)(a)(ii) (1979).
38. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-20-050 (1980).
39. Other examples of initiating an active use include constructing subdivision roads to county
standards and installing sewer or water systems.
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forest purposes or land that is only converted to nonforest uses after a
long delay. 40
Subdividing land into small tracts-five acres or less-usually will not
constitute conversion of the land to a nonforest use. If the parcel of land
can support a merchantable stand of timber, then reforestation is re-
quired. 41 The Department decides on a case-by-case basis whether a par-
ticular parcel is capable of supporting a merchantable stand of timber.
The only relevant factors under the Act are the productivity of the land,
the difficulty of logging, and the distance to a market for the timber.42
Thus, on small residential or urban lots reforestation would not be re-
quired because the lots would not support a sufficiently large stand of
timber to pay the costs of logging. On larger rural lots, however, the De-
partment's discretion to require reforestation is limited by the criteria in
the Act. Reforestation on small acreage may be required, although the
land's value for other purposes may far exceed its value as commercial
timber land. 43
Forest practices on land being converted to another use may be subject
to county, city, or other local governmental authority. 44 The Department
40. The Department does not have authority to postpone reforestation if a conversion to another
use is not initiated within three years. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-20-050 (1980). Delays in
reforestation are only authorized if seedlings are unavailable or if weather delays planting. Id. §
222-34-010(2).
41. See note 4 supra (forest land is defined as land capable of supporting a merchantable stand of
timber).
42. A merchantable stand of timber is defined as "a stand of trees that will yield logs and/or
fibre: (a) Suitable in size and quality for the production of lumber, plywood, pulp or other forest
products. (b) Of sufficient value at least to cover all the costs of harvest and transportation to avail-
able markets." WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-16-010(27) (1980).
This definition excludes many variables that normally affect a landowner's decision whether or not
to invest in timber growing on a particular piece of ground. Examples are the costs of reforestation,
the risk of loss to fire, insects, or disease, and the availability of insurance. Another variable excluded
from the definition is the effect of taxes. Land that is subdivided into less than 20-acre parcels no
longer qualifies for classification or designation as forest land for tax purposes. WASH. REV. CODE §
84.33.100(l) (1979). The owner has to pay taxes based on the highest and best use. A landowner
may, however, pay taxes based on the current use on parcels down to five acres in size if classified as
timber land under the open space tax law. Id. § 84.33.020(1).
43. The Department requires reforestation of five-acre lots. E.g., Forest Practice Order No.
FP-04-00997 (excluding 11 acres planned for a homesite). The legislature recognized that the
reforestation requirements of the 1974 Act would have an impact on owners of small acreage. 1975
WASH. HOUSE JOURNAL 1024 (remarks of Rep. Kalich).
The Forest Practices Appeals Board recently discussed the definition of forest land and its relation-
ship to reforestation requirements. Department of Natural Resources v. Petra, No. 79- I, slip op. at
I 1-12 (Wash. Forest Practices App. Bd., Dec. 16, 1980). It found the definition unsuitable since it
did not take into consideration all of the costs of growing timber. See note 42 supra. The Board
recommended that the Forest Practices Board promulgate new regulations applicable to small lan-
downers.
44. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.060(3)(a)(iii) (1979). Local or regional governments have author-
ity to exercise land use planning or zoning authority over forest practices on land being converted to
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forwards a copy of forest practice applications to the county in which the
practice will take place, as well as to the Washington Departments of
Ecology, Game, and Fisheries for comments. 45 If the Department
receives a timely objection from the county on grounds specified in the
Act, then it must disapprove the objectionable portions of the applica-,
tion.46 The Department may appeal the county objections to the Forest
Practices Appeals Board. 47 The applicant also may appeal the disapproval
of the application to the Appeals Board as "a person aggrieved" by the
disapproval. 48
A landowner who intends to convert land to another use may be
tempted to falsify the forest practice application by not revealing this in-
tention. The landowner may falsify the application for two reasons. The
first is to avoid delay. Processing a forest practice application that indi-
cates a conversion to another use takes thirty days, when other types of
forest practice applications take fourteen days or less to process. 49 If a
landowner has contracted with a logger who is ready to go to work, this
delay can be costly.
The second reason to falsify the application is to avoid the exercise of
another use or on land platted after January 1, 1960. Those governments cannot, however, institute a
local permit system solely for forest practices, and cannot require additional or more stringent regula-
tion of forest practices. Id. § 76.09.240(1). Otherwise, local or regional authorities cannot regulate
forest practices except to exercise taxing powers, public health and related powers, or authority under
the Shoreline Management Act of 1971, R.C.W. ch. 90.58. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.240(2)-(4)
(1979). See Comment, Protection of Recreation and Scenic Beauty Under the Washington Forest
PracticesAct, 53 WASH. L. REv. 443,465-66 (1978).
The Washington Supreme Court held void amendments made in 1975 to § 240(4) of the Forest
Practices Act which limited the scope of local authority under the Shoreline Management Act. Weyer-
haeuser v. King County, 91 Wn. 2d 721, 592 P.2d 1109 (1979) (failure to comply procedurally
with WAsH. CONST. art. 2, § 37). The 1981 legislature passed bills which legislatively overruled
Weyerhaeuser and restored the 1975 amendments to the Forest Practices Act, but Governor Spellman
vetoed the bills on May 19, 1981. State of Washington, Sub. S.B. 3728, 47th Sess. (1981); State of
Washington, H.B. 371,47th Sess. (1981).
45. WASH. REv. CODE § 76.09.050(5) (1979).
46. Id. § 76.09.050(5)-(7); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-20-020(2), (6)(a) (1980). If the
county's objections relate either to land platted after January 1, 1960, or land being converted to
another use, then the Department must disapprove the application objected to.
Although the Department is not required to disapprove an application objected to by a county
outside of its limited authority or by the Departments of Ecology, Game, or Fisheries, anyone ag-
grieved by an approval or disapproval of an application can appeal to the Forest Practices Appeals
Board. WASH. REv. CODE § 76.09.220(8)(a) (1979).
47. WASH. REv. CODE § 76.09.050(7) (1979). The Act created the three-member Forest Prac-
tices Appeals Board, which has exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals arising from an action or deter-
mination by the Department. Id. §§ 76.09.210, .220(7).
48. WASH. Rev. CODE § 76.09.220(8)(a) (1979).
49. See notes 33 & 36 supra.
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local authority over forest practices. 50 Local governments can only exer-
cise their planning or zoning authority over forest practices if the applica-
tion indicates an intent to convert the land to another use. 51 By falsifying
the application, the landowner postpones the time when local govern-
ments may exercise their authority until the landowner either files a plat
or applies for a necessary permit. 52
Local officials may suspect that an applicant failed to disclose an intent
to convert to another use. 53 If they wish to exercise authority over the
land before it is logged, then they must notify both the Department and
the applicant that the application should indicate an intent to convert to
another use. Once a local government has made a timely objection, the
Department must reject the application until it is accurate and complete. 54
When the application correctly reflects the intention to convert the land to
another use, the local governments may exercise their authority over the
forest practice. 55
50. See note 44 supra.
On a Class IV forest practice, if the local or regional government is taking some action concerning
the land, then that government can require a detailed environmental impact statement under the State
Environmental Policy Act of 1971 (SEPA), R.C.W. ch. 43.21C. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.050(l)
(1979). See Comment, Protection of Recreation and Scenic Beauty Under the Washington Forest
Practices Act, 53 WASH. L. REV. 443, 465 n. 109 (1978). The local or regional government is respon-
sible for preparing the statement. State Environmental Policy Amendments of 1981. ch. 290. § I.
1981 Wash. Laws 1240.
The Department's authority to require compliance with SEPA is limited to "Class IV Special"
forest practices as they are defined by the Forest Practices Board in WASH. ADMtIN. CODE §
222-16-050(l) (1980). Classes I, II, and III forest practices are exempt from the SEPA requirement
of a detailed statement. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.050(1) (1979); WASH. ADIiN. CODE §
332-40-170(19)(a) (1980); State Environmental Policy Amendments of 1981, ch. 290, § 1, 1981
Wash. Laws 1240. A superior court found the Board's definition of Class IV Special forest practices
to be too narrow compared to the statutory definition of forest practices which have a potential for
substantial impact on the environment. Noel v. Cole. No. 9806, slip op. at 10 (Island County Super.
Ct. Jan. 3, 1979). The Board is presently holding hearings to expand the list of Class IV Special
forest practices.
51. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.240(l) (1979). See note 44 supra.
52. If the landowner removes the trees before local governments can exercise their authority over
a project, then one source of potential dispute with the local governments has been eliminated. The
landowner can also make expensive improvements on the land during logging, particularly by con-
structing roads, that can later be presented to local authorities as afait accompli.
53. Local officials may have access to information that the Department does not have. A plat
may have been submitted to a county office, or the land may have been otherwise proposed for
conversion to another use.
54. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.050(6)-(7) (1979); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-20-040(1)(a)
(1980).
55. Some county authorities have expressed concern that the Department's refusal to recognize
platting as a conversion for reforestation purposes prevents the county governments from using plat-
ting as a conversion for local authority purposes. The two positions, however, are not inconsistent.
The Department refuses to recognize platting as an initiation of another use within three years after
logging. This does not prevent it from recognizing platting as an indication of intent to convert to
another use at the application stage.
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The Act provides sanctions that may be applied against a landowner
who does not disclose the intent to convert the land to another use. The
purpose of these sanctions is to discourage conversion of the land after it
has been logged. First, the local government may deny any permit appli-
cations 56 for nonforestry uses of the land for six years. 57 Second, failure
to reforest removes the land from favorable property tax designations. 58
Third, unauthorized conversion may violate local ordinances governing
conversion of land to nonforest uses.59
B. Enforcing the Act
The Forest Practices Act provides alternative means of enforcing the
obligation to reforest. If a landowner fails to reforest, then the first en-
forcement effort usually is an order from the Department to the operator60
or to the landowner to comply with the Act.61 The order must indicate the
steps to be taken to comply with the Act. For example, if the required
number of trees per acre of the proper species failed to survive after three
years, then the Department may order the landowner to do supplemental
planting. 62 The operator must undertake the required course of action im-
mediately, unless the landowner, timber owner,63 or operator requests a
hearing before the Department. If, after a hearing, the Department issues
an order adverse to the petitioners, then the petitioners may appeal to the
Forest Practices Appeals Board.64
56. Permits that could be denied would include zoning variances, building permits, and subdivi-
sion approvals.
57. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.060(3)(b)(i) (1979).
58. Id. § 76.09.060(3)(b)(ii). When land is removed from classification or designation as forest
land, compensating taxes may become due. For example, under the timber and forest land tax law the
compensating tax is equal to the difference between the tax levied on the forest land and the new
assessed valuation multiplied by the dollar rate of the last levy, multiplied by the number of years the
land, was designated as forest land, up to 10 years. WASH. REV. CODE § 84.33.140(3) (1979). See
also WASH. REV. CODE §§ 84.28.065 (removal from classification as reforestation land), .34.080
(1979) (change in use under open space designation).
59. WASH. REv. CODE § 76.09.060(3)(b)(iii) (1979).
60. An operator is defined as "any person engaging in forest practices except an employee with
wages as his sole compensation." Id. § 76.09.020(11); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-16-010(29)
(1980).
61. See WASH. Rev. CODE § 76.09.090 (1979); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-46-030 (1980). The
Department can issue a notice to the operator or to the landowner, and must mail a copy to each of
them, as well as to the timber owner.
62. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
63. A timber owner is defined as "any person having all or any part of the legal interest in
timber. Where such timber is subject to a contract of sale, 'timber owner' shall mean the contract
purchaser." WASH. REv. CODE § 76.09.020(15) (1979). The operator, timber owner, and landowner
on a forest practice application may be one person.
64. Id. § 76.09.090; WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 222-12-080, -46-030 (1980).
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Alternatively, the Department may issue a stop work order. 65 If the
operator violates the Act or deviates from the approved application, and if
forest practice operations are currently taking place, then this order may
be issued to stop the operations. A stop work order might issue, for exam-
ple, if an operator were cutting down seed trees that the approved refores-
tation plan indicated would be left standing. Again, the order must set
forth a specific course of conduct that the operator must undertake to cor-
rect the problem. 66 The operator may appeal a stop work order directly to
the Forest Practices Appeals Board. 67
Both the notice to comply with the Act and the stop work order are final
orders. The Department may, through the attorney general, take any nec-
essary action to enforce a final order of the Department, a final decision of
the Forest Practices Appeals Board, or the order of any court. It may seek
both civil and criminal fines. 68
The Act also permits the Department to undertake and to complete a
required course of action. 69 If an operator fails to comply with a final
order or decision, then the Department may determine the costs of doing
the required work. The Department must give written notice of the costs
to the operator, the timber owner, and the forest landowner. 70 If all fail to
undertake the work within thirty days, then the Department may either do
the work or have it done. The operator, timber owner, and forest land
owner are then jointly and severally liable for the direct costs of reforesta-
tion. The Department must notify the forest landowner in writing of the
amount due. If these costs are not paid within sixty days after notice, then
the amount becomes a lien on the forest land. 71
65. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.080 (1979); WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 222-12-050(2), -46-040
(1980).
66. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.080(2)(c) (1979); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-46-040(2)(c)
(1980).
67. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.080(2)(d) (1979); WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 222-12-080,
-46-040(2)(d) (1980). See WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.230 (1979).
68. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 76.09.140, .170, .190 (1979); WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 222-46-060.
-070, -080 (1980). In addition, the Department may, through the attorney general, take action to
enjoin forest practices for one year by any person who fails to comply with a final order. WASH. REV.
CODE § 76.09.140 (1979).
69. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.120 (1979); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-46-050 (1980).
70. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.120 (1979). The costs billed may not exceed the costs in the
notice.
71. Id. The Department may collect the amount in the same manner as provided in R.C.W. ch.
60.04 for mechanic's liens.
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II. SUBSEQUENT LANDOWNERS ARE REQUIRED TO
REFOREST
Landowners may log their land and then sell it before it is reforested.
The Department requires the new landowner, as the one in actual control
of the land, to reforest. 72 The facts of a case recently before the Forest
Practices Appeals Board illustrate the impact of the Act's requirements on
purchasers of forest land. The issue in Department of Natural Resources
v. Petra73 was whether Petra, a purchaser of land that had been logged by
the previous landowner, could be required to reforest under the Act de-
spite his lack of knowledge of the requirement. The Appeals Board held
that Petra was responsible for reforesting the land he owned at the time of
appeal. 74
In Petra, one hundred and sixty acres of land in rural Lewis County
were clearcut by the landowner. The landowner had obtained an approved
forest practice application indicating that reforestation would be accom-
plished by hand planting of seedlings, but the land was not reforested.
Within six months after logging, the land was sold to Petra. Petra knew it
had been logged, but did not know of the forest practice application or of
the obligation to reforest. There was no indication of the obligation on his
deed, title records, or title insurance. After Petra subdivided the land into
five-acre tracts, and sold fifteen tracts to third parties, the Department
issued Petra a notice requiring reforestation on the land that he owned.
Petra appealed the order to the Department, then to the Appeals Board,
which held that he 'was required to reforest.
Petra was required to reforest the land that he owned because he was
the person in actual control of the land at the time reforestation was re-
quired. It follows that the persons who purchased the five-acre tracts from
72. See notes 78-80 and accompanying text infra.
73. No. 79-1 (Wash. Forest Practices App. Bd., Dec. 16, 1980). The ruling of the Appeals
Board in Petra may have no precedential effect. The decision was signed by only two members of the
three-member Board, which would normally be enough for a quorum. WASH. REv. CODE § 76.09.-
220(3)-(4) (1979). One of the signing members, however, was never confirmed by the state senate,
and when the new Governor took office in 1981, he replaced that member. See WASH. REv. CODE §
76.09.210(3) (1979). This comment uses the facts of Petra for illustration, and does not rely on the
holding or the reasoning of the Appeals Board.
74. The Board reasoned that the subsequent landowner would benefit from reforestation because
of the increased value of the land. Since the Forest Practices Act was concerned about the value of
forest land, the Board felt that the Act meant to place the burden on the one who would realize the
value from it. Department of Natural Resources v. Petra, No. 79-1, slip op. at 5-7 (Wash. Forest
Practices App. Bd., Dec. 16, 1980). The Board rejected Petra's argument that he was not responsible
for reforestation because the requirement was not recorded on his title. The Board said the require-
ment was imposed by law, and an analogy to the private land law principle of a bona fide purchaser
was "inapposite." The Board said that even if Petra did not know the land had been recently logged,
he would still have to reforest. Id. at 7.
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Petra were also responsible for reforesting the land they owned at the time
reforestation was required. 75
The issue raised in Petra-whether subsequent landowners are re-
quired to reforest-will next be examined. Part III discusses the problem
created by the effect of the law on subsequent landowners who are un-
aware of the requirement of reforestation at the time they purchase the
land and discusses possible reforms.
A. Interpreting the Act
The Forest Practices Act does not designate explicitly who must re-
forest. 76 The enforcement provisions, however, require that the land-
owner, the timber owner, and the operator comply with all of the provi-
sions of the Act. 77 The issue is whether the landowner who submitted the
application to log, or the successor landowner who owns the land at the
time enforcement action is taken, is the landowner who must reforest.
Authority for the position that the obligation to reforest runs with the
land to successor landowners is found in the Act's definition of a forest
landowner. A forest landowner is defined as any person in actual control
of forest land. 78 Once the land is sold, the landowner who signed the
application cannot have actual control over the land. Only the successor
landowner, with legal or equitable title at the time enforcement action is
taken, 79 has actual control over the land. Consequently, under the Act,
the successor landowner is responsible for reforestation. 80
75. For a discussion of the Act's application to small landowners, see notes 39-43 and accompa-
nying text supra.
76. R.C.W. § 76.09.070 and W.A.C. § 222-34-010 to -020 provide that reforestation must be
done, but do not say by whom. Cf. Oregon Forest Practices Act, OR. REV. RULES § 629-24-402,
-502, -602 (1981) (amended in 1980 to identify the landowner as the party responsible for reforesta-
tion). But see WASH. ADMIN. CODE §§ 222-34-030(2), (4)(i) (landowner to submit reforestation
report and do supplemental planting). 222-34-030(4)(c) (1980) (landowner may obtain a release for
satisfactory reforestation).
77. See text accompanying notes 60-71 supra. A proposed 1981 amendment to the Act would
have designated the landowner as the person responsible for reforestation. State of Washington, Sub.
H.B. 419, 47th Sess. (1981).
78. "Forest land owner" shall mean any person in actual control of forest land, whether such
control is based either on legal or equitable title, or on any other interest entitling the holder to
sell or otherwise dispose of any or all of the timber on such land in any manner: Provided, that
any lessee or other person in possession of forest land without legal or equitable title to such land
shall be excluded from the definition of "forest land owner" unless such lessee or other person
has the right to sell or otherwise dispose of any or all of the timber located on such forest land.
WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.020(7) (1979); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-16-010(18) (1980). An
owner of land that has been logged is still a forest landowner. See note 4 supra.
79. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.020(7) (1979); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-16-010(18) (1980).
80. The Washington Act's definition of a forest landowner as one in actual control of land is
unique. Cf. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 4527.5 (West Supp. 1981) ("timber owner" is any person who
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The Washington Supreme Court has held that successor landowners are
liable for an obligation analogous to reforestation. The issue in State v.
Loertscher81 was whether a landowner was liable for forest fire fighting
costs under the "slash statute,''82 which required abatement of a fire
hazard created by slash left after logging. The court held that the land-
owner was liable for the costs because he was required to abate the fire
hazard, even though he was not the landowner at the time the hazard was
created. 83
In Loertscher, the court first identified the purpose of the slash statute:
to abate fire hazards. The statute placed the burden of abatement on the
logger and on the landowner. The court placed the burden of abatement
on subsequent landowners. The court concluded that this construction
was necessary to accomplish the purposes of the statute. 84 As long as the
condition created by the slash persisted, every subsequent owner acquired
the land encumbered with the obligation to abate the condition and with
the potential liability for costs resulting from the failure to do so. 85
The requirement of slash abatement in Loertscher is analogous to the
requirement of reforestation in the Forest Practices Act. The reasoning of
the Loertscher court can be applied to the issue whether subsequent land-
owners acquire forest land encumbered with the obligation to reforest.
The sections below follow the Loertscher reasoning.
1. The Purpose of the Act
The purpose of the Forest Practices Act is to protect the forest re-
owns timber land); IDAHO CODE § 38-1303(6) (Supp. 1980) and OR. REv. STAT. § 527.620(6) (1979)
(landowner is one who holds an ownership interest in forest land).
81. 64Wn.2d340,391 P.2d520 (1964).
82. Act of Mar. 19, 1951, ch. 235, § 1, 1951 Wash. Laws 742 (current version at WASH. REv.
CODE § 76.04.370 (1979)). Obligations under the slash statute and enforcement provisions were simi-
lar to those of the Forest Practices Act. The Department could clean up the slash and bill those
responsible for the costs. If they did not pay, then the Department could file a lien against the land.
State v. Loertscher, 64 Wn. 2d 340, 341, 391 P.2d 520, 521 (1964).
83. In Loertscher, the landowner logged 40 acres of land, left the land covered with slash, and
then conveyed the land to Loertscher. A year and a half later a fire broke out and spread through the
unburned slash onto adjoining land. The Department of Natural Resources put out the fire and billed
Loertscher for the costs under the authority of the slash statute. Id. at 342, 391 P.2d at 521 (1964).
84. Id. at 345-46, 391 P.2d at 523-24. The court found that the means employed to abate the
fire hazard were not arbitrary or unreasonable since those held liable either created the hazard or
'suffer[ed] it to remain upon theirproperty .. . '" Id. at 346, 391 P.2d at 524.
85. In 1971 the entire statutory scheme for treating fire hazards due to slash was changed to
require abatement of "extreme hazards" only. WASH. REv. CODE § 76.04.370 (1979). Forest land-
owners now pay assessments to fund fire control operations, rather than bear absolute liability, for all
but extreme hazards. Id. §§ 76.04.360, .515.
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sources of the state for both economic and environmental reasons. 86 Re-
forestation is required to protect, promote, foster, and encourage com-
mercial timber growth on forest land. 87
Public policy in Washington favors reforestation. This policy was re-
flected in the state's early enactment of a strong forest practice law. 88
Washington Supreme Court decisions interpreting the 1945 Act empha-
sized the importance of protecting the timber resources of the state. In
State v. Dexter,89 the court recognized the problem of reforestation of
vast areas of the state and the need for planting trees in denuded areas. 90
In West Norman Timber, Inc. v. State,91 the court said that the preserva-
86. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.010(1) (1979) provides:
The legislature hereby finds and declares that the forest land resources are among the most valu-
able of all resources in the state; that a viable forest products industry is of prime importance to
the state's economy; that it is in the public interest for public and private commercial forest lands
to be managed consistent with sound policies of natural resource protection; that coincident with
maintenance of a viable forest products industry, it is important to afford protection to forest
soils, fisheries, wildlife, water quantity and quality, air quality, recreation, and scenic beauty.
See also notes 8 & 9 supra.
87. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.010(2)(a) (1979). For the text of the statute, see note 8 supra.
88. Act of Mar. 15, 1945, ch. 193, 1945 Wash. Laws 556 (repealed 1974). See text accompany-
ing notes 10-15 supra; Cubbage & Ellefson, State Forest Practice Laws: A Major Force Unique to
the Natural Resources Community, 13 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 421, 427 (1980).
The legislature stated the policy in the 1945 Act:
Keeping the forest land of this state continuously and fully productive is one of the most impor-
tant steps toward perpetuation and conservation of its forest resources. One of the most impor-
tant means of effectuating such public policy is to keep timber lands productive by seeking to
maintain continuous growth of timber on all lands suitable for such purposes, and in order to
accomplish this end it is necessary, and in the public interest, to prescribe certain rules of forest
practices to be observed in the harvesting of timber.
Act of Mar. 15, 1945, ch. 193, § 1, 1945 Wash. Laws 556 (repealed 1974). A state policy in favor of
reforestation had been expressed earlier than 1945. See State ex rel. Mason County Logging Co. v.
Wiley, 177 Wash. 65, 71, 31 P.2d 539, 542 (1934) (favorable tax treatment for land being re-
forested).
89. 32 Wn. 2d 551, 202 P.2d 906, affid, 338 U.S. 863 (1949). The court held that the require-
ment of reforestation in the 1945 Act was a proper exercise of the state's police power. See note 109
infra.
90. 32 Wn. 2d at 555-56, 202 P.2d at 908. Judge Hill went on to say:
Edmund Burke once said that a great unwritten compact exists between the dead, the living, and
the unborn. We leave to the unborn a colossal financial debt, perhaps inescapable, but incurred,
none the less, in our time and for our immediate benefit. Such an unwritten compact requires
that we leave to the unborn something more than debts and depleted natural resources. Surely,
where natural resources can be utilized and at the same time perpetuated for future generations,
what has been called "constitutional morality" requires that we do so. In that way, we can, in
the words of Chief Justice Hughes, use "reasonable means to safeguard the economic structure
upon which the good of all depends."
Id. at 556-57, 202 P.2d at 908 (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 442
(1933)).
91. 37 Wn. 2d 467, 479, 224 P.2d 635, 641-42 (1950). The court held that the provisions of the
Forest Practices Act applied to operations on state as well as on private lands.
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tion and the perpetuation of the vast timber resources of the state was
important to the state and to the public.
The 1974 Act strengthens and extends the obligation to reforest by re-
quiring successful regeneration of a new stand of trees. 92 In passing the
1974 Act, the legislature rejected the often unsuccessful methods of re-
forestation allowed by the 1945 Act. 93 The provisions of the 1974 Act
and the history of reforestation in the state emphasize that a primary pur-
pose of the Forest Practices Act is reforestation of land after logging.
2. Accomplishing the Purpose
Subsequent landowners must be required to reforest to accomplish the
purposes of the Act. While logging is actually occurring, compliance or-
92. The more stringent requirements of the 1974 Act parallel the growing concern in the forestry
profession that timber supply will not keep up with anticipated increases in demand. Foresters gener-
ally anticipate that: 1) future demand for timber will exceed supply, and prices will consequently rise;
and 2) nonindustrial private forest landowners, who own 59% of the country's commercial forest
land, are managing their land poorly and will produce much less timber than they are capable of
producing. LeMaster, Timber Supply, Nonindustrial Private Forest Land, and the Conventional
View, 1978 J. FORESTRY 365. In western.Washington, nonindustrial private landowners own 23% of
all commercial timber land. Although 92% of all commercial timber land is best suited to growing
conifers, only 60% is currently stocked with them. The rest is either not stocked with trees at all, or is
stocked with hardwoods. W. Koss & B. ScOTT, A PROFILE OF WESTERN WASHINGTON'S NONINDUS-
TRIAL FOREST LANDOWNERS 3-5 (Dep't of Natural Resources Report No. 37, 1978).
The most recent assessment of the timber situation in the United States found that demands for
most timber products are likely to continue to rise rapidly in the future. Although the domestic timber
resource has improved substantially, the study projected that increases in the prices of stumpage and
timber products will have a significant adverse effect on the timber industry, employment, consum-
ers, and the environment. It found, however, that there is a large potential for increases in timber
growth and supply, especially from regeneration of nonstocked acres, harvesting and regeneration of
mature stands, and conversion of existing stands to more desired species. Most of the anticipated
economic opportunities were on nonindustrial private forest lands. Hair, Timber Situation in the
United States 1952-2030, 1980 J. FORESTRY 683.
Forest economist Marion Clawson disagrees with projections of a "timber famine," calling those
projections "one of the hoariest folk tales of American forestry." He found that total volume of all
growing stock in the United States has increased substantially from 1952 to 1970; that there have
been significant increases in annual growth; and that the total sawtimber inventory remained the
same. He claimed that there is little or no evidence that the volume of standing stock has declined at
all since the turn of the century. He doubts that future trends in prices will be any steeper than those in
the past. Clawson, Will There Be Enough Timber?, 1978 J. FORESTRY 274. See generally Ayer. Public
Regulation of Private Forestry: A Survey and a Proposal, 10 HARV. J. LEGis. 407, 422 (1973);
Pardo, Forestry Law and Policy, 7 U. TOL. L. REv. 999, 1002-04, 1019-21 (1976); Quinney, Small
Private Forest Landownership in the United States-Individual and Social Perception, 3 NAT. RE-
SOURCES J. 379 (1964); Comment, Protection of Recreation and Scenic Beauty Under the Washington
Forest PracticesAct, 53 WASH. L. REv. 443,450 n.34 (1978).
Reforestation is important for environmental reasons as well as for future timber supply. It helps
prevent erosion and protects water quality. Regrowth of forest cover provides wildlife-habitat and
greatly mitigates the adverse aesthetic effects of logging. See CommentpRegulation of Private Log-
ging in California, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 139, 167 (1978).
93. See notes 10-15 and accompanying text supra.
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ders are directed primarily against the operator. 94 Once logging is com-
pleted, however, enforcement against the operator or the timber owner
becomes difficult and may be ineffective. In the three to five years that the
Act allows for reforestation, transfers of property interests by sale, bank-
ruptcy, death, or forfeiture are possible. 95 Years after a logging operation
is completed, the Department may not be able to locate any of the original
parties who signed the forest practice application. If they can be located,
they may be insolvent. The Forest Practices Act recognizes these prob-
lems, yet requires that reforestation occur.
The purpose of the enforcement provisions of the Act is to accomplish
reforestation. The provisions for civil and criminal penalties are available
to spur violators into remedial action. Fines, however, are not a substitute
for results. There is no provision for collecting a fine from the landowner,
the operator, or the timber owner who signed the application but who did
not comply with the Act, and then using the money to reforest the land. 96
The Department's ultimate remedy is foreclosing the lien on the land,
which affects the person who then owns the land. 97
The successor landowner who is in control of the forest land is the only
one in a position to reforest. To interpret the Act as binding the previous
landowner would produce an anomalous result. There is no authority
under the Act for the Department to order an ex-landowner to enter on
land now owned by a subsequent landowner to reforest it. Reforestation
could involve using heavy equipment, burning slash, or applying chemi-
cals. The Act grants the Department the power to enter private land to
94. The operator is available at the site to do remedial work. Usually stop work orders and civil
and criminal penalties are sufficient to obtain compliance from the operator, and it is not necessary to
direct enforcement against the landowner.
95. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 222-20-010(6) (1980) permits transfer of an approved application to
other parties. Active logging operations can extend over several seasons, and it is not unusual for
timber buyers to sell their contractual rights to the timber or to use different loggers to harvest it. This
regulation permits these transfers without requiring a new forest practice application.
Transfer requires written notice by the original applicant to the Department. If a landowner sells
land, but fails to notify the Department, then the landowner could be liable for a fine. It should not
affect a subsequent landowner's obligation to reforest, however, because an application is not re-
quired to do most reforestation work. An approved application for logging is only effective for one
year. Reforestation is a Class I forest practice. id. § 222-16-050(3)(j), which does not require an
application or notification to the Department. Therefore, the transfer provision would not normally
apply to reforestation.
96. See WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.180 (1979) (any money from penalties is deposited in the
state's general fund).
97. See WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.020 (1979). Compare CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 4605 (West
Supp. 1981) (like Washington's Act, authorizes a lien on the property on which the action was taken)
with OR. REV. STAT. § 527,690(4) (1979) (authorizes a lien on both the real and personal property of
the operator, timber owner, and landowner) and with NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 528.043(3). .046 (1979)
(requires a performance bond by the applicant, to be released once reforestation is accomplished).
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reforest, 98 but grants no corresponding power to private parties. Thus, an
order requiring an ex-landowner to reforest would be outside the Depart-
ment's authority, and if obeyed, might subject the ex-landowner to liabil-
ity for trespass.
The reasoning of the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Lo-
ertscher99 leads, by analogy, to the conclusion that subsequent owners of
forest land are responsible for reforestation even though they did not own
the land when it was logged. Only if the burden of reforestation is placed
on every subsequent owner of unreforested land will the purpose of the
Act-actual reforestation-be accomplished.
I. EVALUATING POSSIBLE REFORMS
A. The Need for Reform
The legislature, the Forest Practices Appeals Board, and the Depart-
ment have proposed both legislative and administrative reforms of the Act
to improve notice of the reforestation requirements to purchasers of forest
land. 00 The result in Department of Natural Resources v. Petra10 illus-
trates the need for reform. Petra was responsible for reforestation despite
his lack of knowledge of the requirement. Petra argued that he should not
be required to reforest because he was protected by the recording statute
and the requirement to reforest was not recorded on his title to the land.
The Forest Practices Appeals Board rejected his argument. 102
Washington's recording act'03 provides constructive notice' 04 of prior
conveyances of property and of private contracts and covenants that bind
the land. 105 The recording act does not apply to obligations imposed by
98. WASH. REV. CODE § 76.09.150 (1979).
99. 64 Wn. 2d 340,391 P.2d 520(1964).
100. See State of Washington, Sub. H.B. 419, 47th Sess. (1981); Department of Natural Re-
sources v. Petra, No. 79-1 (Wash. Forest Practices App. Bd., Dec. 16, 1980); and note 108 infra.
101. No. 79-1 (Wash. Forest Practices App. Bd., Dec. 16, 1980).
102. See note 74 supra.
103. WASH. REv. CODE § 65.08.070 (1979). Washington's recording statute protects a bona fide
purchaser whose deed is recorded against any outstanding unrecorded conveyances of the same prop-
erty. Biles-Coleman Lumber Co. v. Lesamiz, 49 Wn. 2d 436, 438-39, 302 P.2d 198, 199-200
(1956).
104. Constructive notice is notice that a person is deemed to have by operation of law. Sands v.
United States, 198 F. Supp. 880, 884 (W.D. Wash. 1960), aff'd sub nom. First Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n of Bremerton v. United States, 295 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1961). It contrasts with actual notice as
one would normally understand it: actual notice of the facts involved.
105. See WASH. REv. CODE §§ 65.08.060(3), .070 (1979); Rodruck-v. Sand Point Maintenance
Comm., 48 Wn. 2d 565, 295 P.2d 319 (1956); Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co. v. Seattle Constr. & Dry
Dock Co., 102 Wash. 608, 173 P. 508 (1918).
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regulatory laws. 106 There are many state statutes and regulations that im-
pose affirmative duties on landowners. 107 These laws require permits, li-
censes, or variances that are not required to be recorded either by the
recording act or by the particular enabling act. 108 Regulatory laws may
impose obligations that affect the value of the land, but they do not trans-
fer any interest to the state or cloud the owner's title to the land. 109 Pur-
chasers of land cannot rely on record title to reveal the state laws that will
affect them as landowners. 110
106. An obligation imposed by law is not a conveyance. A conveyance is broadly defined as a
written instrument that creates or transfers any estate or interest in real property, or that affects the
title to any real property. WASH. REV. CODE § 65.08.060(3) (1979). Conveyances that must be re-
corded to give constructive notice include: deeds, WASH. REV. CODE § 65.04.030(l) (1979); real
estate contracts, WASH. REV. CODE § 65.08.080 (1979); mortgages, WASH. REV. CODE § 65.04.-
030(l) (1979), including mortgages on timber, Enterprise Timber, Inc. v. Washington Title Ins. Co.,
76 Wn. 2d 479, 457 P.2d 600 (1969); liens, WASH. REv. CODE §§ 60.04.060, 65.04.060 (1979);
easements, City of Spokane v. Catholic Bishop, 33 Wn. 2d 496, 206 P.2d 277 (1979); leases.
WASH. REV. CODE § 65.04.030(1) (1979); and options, Strong v. Clark, 56 Wn. 2d 230, 352 P.2d
183 (1960). These are all traditional property encumbrances which convey an estate or interest in land
to another. They are unlike obligations imposed by regulatory laws, which do not convey an estate or
real property interest to the state. Obligations imposed by law are also not private contracts or coven-
ants that bind the land.
107. They include the State Environmental Policy Act of 1971, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 43.21C
(1979), the Shoreline Management Act of 1971, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 90.58 (1979). the Surface
Mined Land Reclamation Act of 1974, WASH. REV. CODE ch. 78.04 (1979), the Noxious Weed Act.
WASH. REV. CODE ch. 17.10, the Forest Insect and Disease Control Act. WASH. REV. CODE ch.
76.06 (1979). as well as local land use planning and zoning ordinances.
108. The Forest Practices Act does not require recording of applications. Cf. CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE § 4608 (West Supp. 1981) (may record notice of violations). If the Department files a lien
against the land for reforestation work done under the Act, then it must record the lien within ninety
days to be effective. The recorded lien provides constructive notice to all subsequent purchasers.
WASH. REV. CODE § 60.04.060 (1979).
Forest practice applications could be recorded on titles. County auditors are authorized to record
anything offered for that purpose. WASH. REV. CODE § 65.04.030 (1979). Officials in the Department
have started to record applications when they anticipate reforestation problems. They have not re-
corded them in great numbers, however. The Department received almost 10,000 applications in
1980.23 TOTEM 5 (Jan. 1981). There is presently no application fee, which would be needed to cover
even a modest recording fee for all applications.
109. The argument that required reforestation is a taking without just compensation is foreclosed
by an important Washington case. The issue in State v. Dexter, 32 Wn. 2d 551, 202 P.2d 906, aff d.
338 U.S. 863 (1949), was whether the state, under its police power, could require reforestation under
the 1945 Forest Practices Act. The court held that the requirement of reforestation was a proper and
reasonable exercise of the state's police power, although the requirement restricted land use and
might impose hardship in individual cases. The 1974 Act, although more stringent than the 1945 Act,
is also a reasonable and proper exercise of the state's police power and does not constitute a taking.
See Cubbage & Ellefson, State Forest Practice Laws: A Major Policy Force Unique to the Natural
Resources Community, 13 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 421, 424-25 (1980); Stacer, The Oregon Forest
Conservation Act, 2 WILLAMETTE L.J. 268,282-84 (1962).
110. Record title cannot protect the purchaser of land against some private interests in land ei-
ther. See Mugaas v. Smith, 33 Wn. 2d 429, 206 P.2d 332 (1949) (recording statute does not apply to
transfer of title by adverse possession).
Purchasers of land have constructive notice of the obligation to reforest because it is required by
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Petra's argument that he was protected by the recording act was unsuc-
cessful, but it reveals a problem created by the effect of the Act on subse-
quent landowners. They may have had nothing to do with the logging
operation, may have received no money from the sale of the timber, may
have had no knowledge of the Act, yet must pay the unanticipated costs
of reforestation. I "' In order to allocate fairly the burden of reforestation in
either the timber sale or the land sale, both parties must actually know of
the obligation to reforest and must anticipate the costs.
The requirement of reforestation, therefore, has significant implica-
tions for persons involved in forest practices. Landowners, timber own-
ers, and operators should be aware of the requirement when bargaining
for the sale of timber or for a logging contract. They can then shift the
burden to the party who can accomplish it most efficiently."l 2 The re-
quirement that subsequent landowners reforest has similar implications
for parties to a sale of logged land. Purchasers who are aware of the re-
quirement can protect themselves in the transaction. '1 3 The price paid for
the land should reflect whether the land has been reforested or not. 114
law: persons are held to constructive notice of statutes and regulations that are properly enacted and
published. Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228, reh. denied, 355 U.S. 937 (1958); State v.
Everitt, 127 Wash. 265, 269,220 P. 797,799 (1923). See State v. Northwest Magnesite Co., 28 Wn.
2d 1, 24, 182 P.2d 643, 655 (1947). In addition to constructive notice of the obligation to reforest,
the Act provides for additional notice and an opportunity for a hearing at each step of enforcement.
Thus, before the Department seeks penalties or enters on land to reforest, the landowner receives
notice of the action being taken and has an opportunity to appeal the action either to the Department
or to the Forest Practices Appeals Board. See part I. B. supra.
111. The estimated costs of reforestation in Department of Natural Resources v. Petra were
$307.50 per acre. Costs of reforestation in western Washington increase dramatically as time passes
after logging. Immediately following clearcutting, the land may be bare enough to permit hand plant-
ing of seedlings without further site preparation for under $150.00 per acre. As time passes, brush
and undesirable tree species take over the site and planting may be impossible without treating the
competing vegetation. Necessary site preparation may include broadcast burning, scarification with
heavy equipment, and the use of herbicides. Costs can rise to well over $400.00 per acre.
112. For example, forest landowners who wish to sell their land to urban buyers for recreational
property may not want the burden on the land to discourage buyers. The landowner can require either
the timber purchaser or the operator to reforest, and can expect to receive a lower price for the timber
to compensate for the additional work. If landowners expect to sell their land to a timber company,
however, they may wish to leave the reforestation work to the purchaser, who may have better access
to seedlings, equipment, and expertise.
113. Sellers of land should also be careful to protect themselves against inadvertently succeeding
to an obligation to reforest. One way to shift the burden of reforestation to a successor landowner is to
purchase the land under a real estate contract, log it, and then default on the contract. The contract
holder becomes responsible for reforestation. This scheme should be profitable as long as profits on
the timber sale exceed the forfeited payments on the land and the contract does not provide remedies
to the contract holder. This may be a fairly common practice. See McGough v. Timber Movers, No.
43308 (Cowlitz County Super. Ct. Nov. 8, 1978).
114. Besides negotiating the price, there are other ways a purchaser of land can protect against
the obligation to reforest. Purchasers of forest land may seek a guarantee from the seller that the land
is free of any obligation that arises under the Act. They may require indemnification from the seller
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Under the present law, subsequent landowners who are required to re-
forest have only limited remedies. First, they may have grounds for re-
covery against the previous landowner, depending on the nature of their
transaction and any applicable warranties or covenants in their real estate
contract or deed. 115 For example, a purchaser may have grounds for re-
scission for misrepresentation or fraud if the seller actively misrepresented
to the buyer that reforestation would not be required. 116 Similarly, a pur-
chaser may have grounds for rescission based on mutual mistake if both
parties were clearly mistaken about the reforestation requirement. 1 7 To
rescind under either theory, however, the purchaser must prove that the
obligation to reforest was a material fact. A material fact is one that
would have prevented the purchaser from buying the land if the purchaser
had known of the omitted or concealed information. 118 This proof may be
difficult to establish.
Second, subsequent landowners may have grounds for recovery against
the operator or the timber owner. If the Department reforests, and if the
landowner reimburses the Department, then the landowner has a right to
contribution from the timber owner and the operator for their share of the
costs. 119 The Act designates all three as jointly and severally liable for the
costs incurred by the Department. 120
These remedies are unlikely to be available. Few land sales involve
fraud or mutual mistake, and the Department, rather than the landowner,
against future expenses. For example, if natural regeneration fails, the costs of planting might be
allocated to the seller. Purchasers may require a release from further reforestation work from the
Department. Or they may want to have the obligation recorded on the title and include it in their title
insurance.
115. See Goldfarb v. Dietz, 8 Wn. App. 464, 506 P.2d 1322 (1973).
116. See Floyd v. Myers, 53 Wn. 2d 351, 333 P.2d 654 (1959); Kaas v. Privette, 12 Wn. App.
142, 529 P.2d 23 (1974). Although a vendor may have a duty to disclose a material fact, Obde v.
Schlemeyer, 56 Wn. 2d 449, 353 P.2d 672 (1960), this duty is distinguishable from a duty to disclose
a rule of law, such as the Forest Practices Act. A purchaser is charged with knowledge of a rule of
law. See Goldfarb v. Dietz, 8 Wn. App. 464,469, 506 P.2d 1322, 1326 (1973).
117. See Vermette v. Andersen, 16 Wn. App. 466, 558 P.2d 258 (1976).
118. See Jensen v. Leggett, 15 Wn. App. 552, 555-56, 550 P.2d 1175, 1178 (1976): Kaas v.
Privette, 12 Wn. App. 142, 149, 529 P.2d 23, 28 (1974).
119. See Proff v. Maley, 14 Wn. 2d 287, 128 P.2d 330 (1942); Karnatz v. Murphy. Pac.
Corp., 8 Wn. App. 76, 503 P.2d 1145 (1972).
120. WAsH. REV. CODE § 76.09.120 (1979). See text accompanying note 71 supra. A person has
a right to contribution from a third party if the third party is liable to them according to the substantive
law. Brown v. Spokane County Fire Protection Dist. No. 1, 21 Wn. App. 886, 893, 586 P.2d 1207,
1212 (1978). The substantive law requiring contribution can be provided by statute. See Hughes v.
Hughes, 11 Wn. App. 454, 458, 524 P.2d 472, 475-76 (1974). Here the substantive law, the Forest
Practices Act, creates joint and several liability. Therefore the landowner has a right to contribution
from the timber owner and the operator if the reforestation work is ultimately done by the Depart-
ment.
An amendment like that proposed in 1981 designating the landowner as the sole party responsible
for reforestation would take away this right to contribution. See note 77 supra.
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will reforest only in rare instances. Purchasers of forest land are likely to
find that they have no satisfactory remedies for unanticipated costs of re-
forestation.' 2 ' They are unable to protect themselves against these costs
unless they know that the land they are buying needs to be reforested. The
Act needs to be reformed to give improved notice of the obligation to
reforest to purchasers of forest land.
B. Criteria for Reform
There are four criteria that any proposal to provide notice of the re-
forestation requirement should meet. First, the proposal must hold the
landowner in control of the land at the time reforestation is required re-
sponsible for reforestation. This is necessary to the successful administra-
tion of the Act. Only by holding the subsequent landowners responsible,
and by allowing the Department to reforest if the landowner fails to, will
actual reforestation occur. 122
Second, the proposal should be fair. Fairness is best accomplished by
requiring actual notice to the parties to a transaction of the obligation to
reforest. The parties can then place the burden where they wish and adjust
the selling price accordingly.
Third, the proposal should provide an incentive to the landowner to
reforest the land as soon as possible after logging. This is necessary silvi-
culturally, since successful reforestation becomes less likely as time
passes.' 23 Also, reforestation costs more as time passes. Consequently
the landowner who contracts to have the land logged is in the best posi-
tion to minimize the costs of reforestation.
121. A landowner may be eligible for state and federal programs that provide both information
and money to assist in reforestation. The state has a farm forestry program, which permits the Depart-
ment to provide foresters to advise landowners on how to reforest and manage their land. In addition,
the Cooperative Forest Management Services Act, R.C.W. ch. 76.52, permits the Department to
extend forest management services to lands nearby, to contract with private landowners to use De-
partment equipment, materials, and personnel, and to encourage intensive management of private
land that otherwise would not be economically feasible. The federal forestry incentives program, 16
U.S.C. § 2103 (Supp. 1979), provides funds to pay part of the costs of reforestation, site preparation,
and other management practices on private forest land.
122. See text accompanying notes 94-99 supra.
123. See note 111 supra. The Department also has opportunities to mitigate the effects of the
reforestation requirements on subsequent landowners through its enforcing the Act. The Department
can enforce certain provisions long before the three to five years allowed for reforestation are up.
Examples are the rules covering slash disposal and site preparation. See note 18 supra. Early enforce-
ment is more likely to have an impact on the operator, the timber owner, and the landowner who
signed the application. They would then leave the land prepared for planting, which would also en-
courage natural regeneration. If reforestation was still necessary at the end of three to five years, the
costs would at least be lower.
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Fourth, the proposal should provide a workable and an effective sanc-
tion to insure compliance with its provisions.
The present law holds the subsequent landowner liable for reforesta-
tion. It does not, however, require actual notice to purchasers of forest
land, and it does not provide an incentive to reforest early. The present
law actually provides a disincentive to reforest to persons intending to sell
land within three years after logging. By sale, they may avoid the costs of
reforestation altogether. 124
C. Proposals for Reform
There are two different reform proposals to improve the notice of the
reforestation requirement given to purchasers of land. The first proposal
is to have either the Department or the landowner who obtains the forest
practice application record the reforestation requirement on the title to the
land. 125 The second proposal is to require sellers of forest land either to
give buyers actual notice of the need to reforest, or to become liable to the
buyer for any costs incurred in reforesting.
The recording proposal satisfies the first criterion: responsibility for re-
forestation continues to rest with the subsequent landowner. The record-
ing proposal, however, only provides constructive notice, and does not
require actual notice of the obligation to reforest. The recording proposal
does provide some incentive for early reforestation. Sellers will be moti-
vated to clear land of outstanding obligations in order to improve the
marketability of the land. Finally, the fourth criterion is not satisfied,
since there is no sanction for failing to record. A purchaser still must re-
forest despite the lack of constructive notice from the recording act, be-
cause the Forest Practices Act provides additional constructive notice. 126
Thus, recording represents some improvement over the present law, but
does not satisfy all of the criteria.
The second proposal was included in a House amendment to the Forest
Practices Act proposed during the 1981 legislative session. 127 The
amendment would have required the seller of forest land to notify the
buyer of the existence and nature of any reforestation obligations prior to
124. The sellers probably receive less for the bare land than they would if the land were cleaned
up and reforested. Nevertheless, unless the difference is greater than the costs of reforestation-at
least $150.00 per acre-there is no incentive to reforest before sale.
125. See note 108 supra. The obligation to reforest could also be listed on the real estate tax
affidavit form, which must be filed with the county as a prerequisite to recording the title. Substitute
House Bill No. 419 would have amended R.C.W. § 28A.45.020 to require this.
126. See note I 10 supra.
127. State of Washington, Sub. H.B. 419, 47th Sess. (1981). The bill passed the House and the
Senate Natural Resources Committee, but failed to be read for a second time in the Senate.
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the transfer of land. The buyer would be required to sign a form, and the
seller would be required to send it to the Department at the time of sale. If
the required notice was not signed or sent to the Department, then the
seller would be liable to the buyer for any costs incurred by the buyer for
reforestation. 128
This proposal satisfies the first criterion. The Department still proceeds
against the subsequent landowner. Rather than shift the responsibility for
reforestation, the proposal gives the purchaser a cause of action against
the seller if the seller fails to give the purchaser actual notice. Actual no-
tice is therefore required. The proposal provides some incentive for early
reforestation, since early reforestation makes land more marketable. The
proposal provides additional incentives to reforest early, because a land-
owner who successfully reforests discharges the obligation to reforest,
and therefore need not give notice either to the purchaser or to the Depart-
ment.
The proposal provides an effective sanction if landowners fail to give
notice to purchasers: they are liable for the costs of reforestation. 129
Both the recording proposal and the actual notice proposal are im-
provements over the present law. Because it satisfies all of the criteria,
the proposal requiring actual notice of the obligation to reforest is the
better proposal.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Washington Forest Practices Act requires successful reforestation
of land after logging. The Act places the obligation to reforest on the
landowner who is in actual control of the forest land. Subsequent land-
128. In addition to liability for costs, the bill provided that the seller who failed to give the
required notice would be guilty of a misdemeanor. Since the Act already provides criminal penalties
for violations, see note 68 and accompanying text supra, this provision is superfluous.
129. An alternative sanction would be to permit rescission of the land sale at the purchaser's
option if the seller failed to give the required notice. This is the sanction provided in Washington's
Land Development Act of 1973, which requires full disclosure of information in the sale of undevel-
oped land that is subdivided into more than ten lots. WASH. Rev. CODE § 58.19.010 (1979). The
public offering statement required by this law should include the requirements of the Forest Practices
Act as a "regulation affecting the development." Id. § 58.19.070(3). See Interstate Land Sales Full
Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-20 (Supp. 1979).
Another proposal, by the Forest Practices Appeals Board, Department of Natural Resources v.
Petra, No. 79-1 (Wash. ForestPractices App. Bd., Dec. 16, 1980), is to require the landownerto post a
compliance bond when outstanding obligations exist. Id. at 8. A bond would fail to meet the firstcriterion,
because it would limit the Department to using the bond to cover the costs of reforestation, rather than
proceeding against the landowner. Bonds often fail to keep up with the costs of reforestation, and the
landowner may find it easier to forfeit the bond rather than to reforest, which was precisely the problem
that existed underthe 1945 Act. See note 15supra.
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owners acquire forest land burdened with that obligation, and are re-
quired to reforest even if they have no actual notice of the requirement.
Purchasers of land who are aware of the reforestation requirement can
allocate it fairly in their transaction with the previous landowner. Pur-
chasers of land who are not aware of the requirement, and who later must
reforest, currently have only limited remedies against the previous land-
owner, the operator, and the timber owner for the unanticipated costs.
The Act should be reformed to improve the notice given to purchasers
of land of the obligation to reforest. A reform proposal should hold subse-
quent landowners responsible for reforestation, should require actual no-
tice to purchasers of that responsibility, should encourage early reforesta-
tion after logging, and should provide an effective sanction. An
amendment to the Act requiring that the seller give actual notice to the
purchaser to reforest, or else be responsible for the costs, is needed.
Until reform takes place, those involved in the ownership and use of
forest land should become familiar with the Forest Practices Act. They
can then equitably distribute the costs of complying with the reforestation
requirement among the parties to a timber sale or to a land sale. This will
help insure that the purposes of the Act are accomplished in an efficient
and equitable manner.
Catherine Phillips Plummer
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